In the pivotal case of Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the United States Supreme Court, under the articulate and unwavering leadership of Justice Thurgood Marshall, issued a powerful affirmation of two foundational rights enshrined in the Constitution: the right to vote and the right to travel. The case challenged Tennessee’s durational residency requirement, which barred citizens from voting in state elections unless they had lived in the state for at least one year and in the county for at least three months. Justice Marshall’s majority opinion struck down the law as unconstitutional, stating unequivocally that such requirements placed an undue burden on citizens’ rights. At the core of his opinion was a profound declaration: the freedom to travel throughout the United States is not a mere convenience or governmental privilege, but a fundamental constitutional right—just as vital and protected as the right to vote. Marshall drew upon a line of precedents, including Shapiro v. Thompson, United States v. Guest, and Crandall v. Nevada, to reinforce the idea that state-imposed barriers to movement or voting must withstand strict scrutiny and serve a compelling state interest, which Tennessee’s law failed to do.
Justice Marshall’s ruling did more than just address the residency requirements for voting; it established a broader constitutional principle linking two fundamental freedoms—travel and suffrage—under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion articulated that both rights are essential to the maintenance of a free and open society. The Court reasoned that denying a recently relocated citizen the right to vote based on an arbitrary time frame penalized the exercise of their constitutional right to interstate travel. Thus, the state’s interference in either domain—whether by restricting ballot access or limiting movement between states—was an infringement on constitutionally protected liberties. The decision emphasized that the Constitution does not tolerate classifications that penalize people for exercising a fundamental right, especially when such classifications are based on arbitrary timeframes or administrative convenience. Marshall made it clear: the state cannot treat new residents as second-class citizens nor can it impose conditions that effectively deter or punish the decision to move from one jurisdiction to another within the United States.
This ruling has far-reaching implications in our current understanding of freedom and state power. When citizens choose to travel within the United States in their private automobiles—absent any engagement in commercial activity or harm to others—they are exercising the same liberty that the Court equated to the right to vote. Both are inherently tied to one's status as a free individual within a constitutional republic. Just as the state may not restrict the ballot box to a privileged few based on arbitrary duration of residence, it likewise may not turn the unalienable right to travel into a privilege regulated by licensure, registration, or permission, especially when done under threat of penalty or seizure. Dunn v. Blumstein reinforces the foundational American doctrine that rights cannot be downgraded into privileges by legislative fiat. The right to vote is not earned by time; it is secured by citizenship. So too is the right to travel, which remains integral to the liberty of movement that sustains informed civic participation, individual autonomy, and the pursuit of happiness free from unconstitutional state interference.